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EVALUATING THE PREEMPTION
EVIDENCE: HAVE THE PROPONENTS
MET THEIR BURDEN?
RICHARD H. WALKER*
I
INTRODUCTION
Striking an appropriate balance between state and federal regulation of our
securities markets is a difficult task.  For more than sixty years, these markets
have operated under a system of overlapping state and federal regulation.  It is
a system that has, for the most part, served investors well, and has contributed
to our markets’ reputation as the fairest and most liquid in the world.
While federal law is supreme in the area of securities regulation, it never
has been the exclusive source of authority over market participants.  State
regulation of securities preceded federal regulation by more than twenty years.1
State legislatures began enacting laws regulating securities transactions early
this century, and today every state has enacted a securities act.2  The federal se-
curities laws were enacted in the 1930s in the wake of the market crash of 1929.
With state law considered inadequate to address the widespread abuses that led
to the crash,3 the federal securities laws were viewed as a supplement to, rather
than a substitute for, state blue sky laws.  Both the Securities Act of 1933
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1. Kansas is credited with enacting the first blue sky law, a state statute providing for regulation
and supervision of securities offerings and sales, in 1911.  See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 367 (2d ed. 1990).
2. See id.
3. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 197, 201 (D. Del. 1983) (discussing abuses
leading to enactment of the federal securities laws).
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(“Securities Act”)4 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”)5
contain express savings clauses preserving state law rights and remedies.6
The philosophy underlying our system of dual sovereignty in the area of se-
curities regulation has remained relatively constant over the last sixty years.
The markets, on the other hand, have undergone rapid growth and develop-
ment.  Markets today are not just national, they are global, with technological
advances improving access to the markets, facilitating trade and commerce
world-wide.  These changes have led to a reconsideration of whether our sys-
tem of joint federal and state regulation achieves the proper balance between
the protection of investors and the promotion of capital formation.
Recently, Congress has begun to reexamine the respective roles of federal
and state law in regulating global markets.  In 1996, for example, Congress en-
acted the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”),7
which strikes a new balance between federal and state regulation of securities
registration, investment adviser registration and oversight,  and other matters.
NSMIA eliminates duplication that previously existed in the overlapping, and
sometimes inconsistent, requirements of federal and state law in these areas.
Congress’s goal in enacting NSMIA was to redivide federal and state regulation
in order to promote efficiency and capital formation in the financial markets.8
While NSMIA substantially reordered regulatory responsibilities between the
states and the federal government, it did nothing to alter the traditional balance
between federal and state law enforcement authority and public and private
rights of action.
Three bills have recently been introduced in Congress that would pick up
where NSMIA left off,9 striking a new balance between the rights of action
provided to injured investors under federal and state law.  Each of the three
bills would preempt certain state law causes of action involving companies with
nationally traded securities.  Two of the three would apply only to class ac-
tions.10  The introduction of these bills has triggered a spirited debate about the
benefits and burdens of state law securities fraud causes of action, evoking
strong responses from market participants, legislators, and academics.  For ex-
ample, members of the high-technology and accounting industries favor the
movement toward abolishing class actions at the state level.11  There is also
                                                          
4. 15 U.S.C §§ 77a-77aa. (1994).
5. See id. §§ 78a-78mm.
6. Securities Act of 1933 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28, 15 U.S.C. §
78bb.
7. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996).
8. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, THE SECURITIES
INVESTMENT PROMOTION ACT OF 1996 2 (June 26, 1996).
9. See H.R. 1653, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced by Reps. Campbell, Klug, and Dooley); H.R.
1689, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced by Reps. Eshoo and White); S. 1260, 105th Cong. (1997)
(introduced by Senators Gramm, Dodd, Domenici, Boxer, Faircloth, Feinstein, Hagel, Reid, Wyden,
Allard, Moseley-Braun, Murray, Lieberman, and Bennett).
10. See H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1260, 105th Cong. (1997).
11. Seventeen business and high-technology organizations, including the American Electronics
Association and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, have banded together to form
WALKER.FMT 09/17/98  8:01 AM
Page 237: Summer 1997] PREEMPTION EVIDENCE 239
strong support on Capitol Hill for uniform standards governing the litigation of
securities fraud lawsuits.12  Others, including members of the plaintiffs’ bar and
various investor groups, oppose the bills.13  It appears likely that the debate
over uniform national standards will soon be resolved, one way or the other, as
key congressional figures have pledged to press for legislation early in the
coming session.14
This article begins with a discussion of the arguments that have been made
in favor of preemption, and then turns to the countervailing considerations.
Next comes a summary of the three preemption bills introduced to date in
Congress.  The final analysis concludes that, while Congress is likely to find
otherwise, the case has not yet been made for broad preemption.
II
THE CASE FOR PREEMPTION
What led to current efforts to alter substantially the system of dual sover-
eignty that has governed our markets for the last sixty years?  A number of fac-
tors have contributed to the introduction of uniform standards legislation, in-
cluding the following: possible loopholes in the Reform Act; fears kindled by
Proposition 211, a plaintiff-friendly California ballot initiative; a reported mi-
gration of securities class actions from federal to state courts in the wake of the
Reform Act; and, ironically, certain findings in the Staff Report to the President
and the Congress on the First Year of Practice Under the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act of 1995 (the “Staff Report” or “Report”) prepared by the
Office of the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC” or “Commission”).15
                                                          
the “Uniform Standards Coalition, Inc.”  The Coalition has been the strongest and most active advo-
cate for uniform standards.
12. H.R. 1689, the preemption bill introduced by Reps. Anna Eshoo and Rick White, has more
than 100 bi-partisan sponsors.
13. See, e.g., Hearings before the Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials, House Comm.
On Commerce on Implementation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 105th Cong. 3
(1997) (testimony of Leonard B. Simon testifying on behalf of the National Association of Securities
and Commercial Law Attorneys) (“Because it is not clear that there will be any means for defrauded
investors to recover fraud losses under federal law after passage of the PSLRA, we oppose any further
reduction in investor protections, particularly suggestions that state antifraud remedies should be pre-
empted.”).
14. See Lott Says Senate Will Act on “Uniform Standards” Bill Before Easter, Press Release, Jan.
28, 1998 (stating Lott’s intention to enact S. 1260 within a few months time); Oversight Hearing on Se-
curities Litigation Abuses, Concerning S. 1260, The “Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1997” Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, 105th Cong. 6 (1997) (statement of Senator Phil Gramm.) (“It’s going to be my plan, as Chair-
man, to move very early next year to try to bring this bill to the floor of the Senate, to vote on it.  Our
objective is to try to make this C well, certainly in this subcommittee and probably in the full commit-
tee C our first order of business next year.  I think this is very important.”) [hereinafter October 29
Hearing].
15. 105th Cong. (1997).  While the Staff Report made certain findings that have been trumpeted
by preemption proponents, see infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text, the Report’s ultimate conclu-
sion was that, based on the limited experience with the Reform Act, legislative changes were not in
order at the present time.  Id.
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A. The Reform Act
The issue of litigation reform has generated considerable debate in recent
sessions of Congress.16  The debate has centered on essentially three issues.
First, whether the litigation system promotes, or unnecessarily tolerates, frivo-
lous securities litigation (that is, strike suits filed solely for their settlement
value) or marginal securities litigation (that is, litigation that, while not wholly
frivolous, is disproportionately costly compared to the likely harm to investors).
Second, whether securities class actions have failed to represent fairly the best
interests of the investor class.  Third, whether securities litigation imposes un-
due financial burdens on accountants and other professional advisers, requiring
replacement of joint and several liability with some form of proportionate li-
ability.
The 103rd Congress answered each of these questions in the affirmative.
Passage of the Reform Act over a veto by President Clinton marked the most
significant alterations to the conduct of private securities litigation since pas-
sage of the federal securities laws.  The Act’s principal provisions are the fol-
lowing:
(1) a “safe harbor” for forward-looking statements;17
(2) a stay of discovery while a motion to dismiss is being decided;
(3) heightened pleading standards requiring specific recital of facts giving
rise to a “strong inference” of fraud;
(4) a “lead plaintiff” provision designed to wrest control of class action liti-
gation from lawyers and to empower institutional shareholders in this context;
(5) mandatory sanctions for violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 11; and
(6) a system of proportionate, as opposed to joint and several, liability for
defendants who are not found to have knowingly committed fraud.
The Act itself does not preempt any state rights or remedies and leaves in-
tact the savings clauses found in both the Securities Act18 and the Exchange
Act.19  In fact, the only statement in the legislative record on the subject shows
that preemption was absent from the minds of the legislators.20
                                                          
16. The groundwork for the litigation reform debate was laid in 1991, with the Supreme Court’s
decision that private actions brought under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act must be commenced
within one year after discovery of the alleged violation, and no more than three years after the viola-
tion occurred.  See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
Hearings in the 102nd Congress to consider the impact of Lampf provided a forum for airing concerns
about alleged abuses in the system of private litigation under the securities laws; since those concerns
were not resolved, the debate continued in the 103rd and 104th Congresses.
17. A safe harbor provision gives protection to those who make an effort to comply with the law.
18. Securities Act of 1933 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1994).
19. Securities Exchange Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1994).
20. See Hearings Concerning the Common Sense Legal Reform Act, Subomm. on Telecomm. and
Finance, House Comm. on Commerce, 103rd Cong. at 110.  (colloquy of Rep. Chistopher Cox with Pro-
fessor Daniel Fischel) (stating in context of discussion of post-Reform Act litigation strategies, “So if
you were a plaintiff, who like any plaintiff has a choice of forum, and if you were one of the investors
who were defrauded in Orange County, for example, you might file your suit in state court or in fed-
eral court depending on how you saw your advantage”).
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Almost from the date of its enactment, the Reform Act has been criticized
as either going too far in limiting investors’ rights or not going far enough to
eliminate frivolous litigation.  Critics of the Reform Act that say it has not
achieved its purpose point to apparent loopholes in the Act that they claim
have led plaintiffs and their counsel to manipulate the system by simply filing
suit in state court where the federal reforms do not apply.  In particular, they
point out that the absence of a safe harbor in state court exposes issuers to the
same unacceptable risks of suit that existed before passage of the Act and that
the discovery stay is too easily avoided by parallel state court lawsuits where
discovery may be permitted to proceed.21  Critics also point out that the number
of new case filings, after a short-lived decline, is approximately the same as pre-
Act levels.22  They argue that stronger measures are needed, specifically  pre-
emption of state causes of action, to achieve Congress’s goal of curbing frivo-
lous litigation.
B. Proposition 211
Following passage of the Reform Act, all eyes quickly turned to California.
Members of the plaintiffs’ bar placed a bold initiative on the state’s November
1996 ballot that would have made California state courts a haven for securities
class actions.  Popularly known as Proposition 211, the initiative was titled “The
Retirement Savings and Consumer Protection Act” by its drafters, a title so
misleading that the state attorney general changed its name to “Attorney-
Client Fee Arrangement-Securities Fraud Initiative.”23  Proposition 211 ignited
a firestorm of nationwide opposition.  Opponents of the measure feared it
would undo the reforms enacted in the Reform Act and cause California to be-
come a mecca for the filing of securities lawsuits.24  The provisions of Proposi-
tion 211 that generated particular alarm included the following:
(1) Extension of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance to com-
mon law fraud actions, where punitive damages are available;
(2) Imposition of liability on those who “participated or assisted” in a fraud;
(3) Mandatory punitive damages when the conduct involved was “willful,
outrageous, or despicable”;
(4) Joint and several liability for all defendants;
(5) A bar preventing issuers from indemnifying any of their officers or di-
rectors; and
(6) No caps on attorneys’ fees.
Both proponents and opponents of Proposition 211 opened their war chests
during the campaign, making it the most expensive ballot initiative in Califor-
                                                          
21. See Edward Brodsky, Discovery Abuses:  A Shifting Target?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 9, 1997, at 3;
Karen Donovan, Full Stop for Fraud Suits in States, NAT’L L. J., MAR. 23, 1998, at A1.
22. See John C. Coffee, First Anniversary:  PSLRA of 1995, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 30, 1997, at 5.
23. See Damon Darlin, A Nice, Clean California Industry, FORBES, Aug. 26, 1996, at 46-47.
24. See Neil A. Lewis, California Measure Could Trump U.S. Law on Securities Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1996, at A13.
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nia’s history.25  After opposition from President Clinton, Senator Dole, and
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, the measure was soundly defeated by a vote of
three to one.26
The defeat of Proposition 211 did little to allay the fears of its opponents
that the measure would soon be reintroduced, either in California or elsewhere.
Even before the votes were counted, those opposed to the initiative were al-
ready considering alternative strategies in the event the initiative passed.  One
such strategy was the enactment of legislation that would preempt Proposition
211 and any similar measures adopted in other states.
The preemption movement was launched when the opponents of Proposi-
tion 211, fresh from  their victory, turned their attention to Washington, D.C.,
to seek federal legislation ensuring that similar initiatives did not resurface in
any state.27  For preemption supporters, the red carpet to Capitol Hill was thus
rolled out by Proposition 211.28
C. The Migration of Securities Class Actions to State Courts
Proponents of preemption soon found additional support for their position.
Fanning the flames of the preemption movement were reports of a migration of
securities fraud class actions from federal to state courts.29
1.  The Quantity of State Cases.  Various authorities have collected data on
the quantity of securities litigation in state courts before and after the Reform
Act.  The data, though, is inconsistent and does not provide a supportable basis
for preemption.
A study conducted by Professors Joseph Grundfest and Michael Perino
found that, during the first year after passage of the Reform Act, sixty-nine
                                                          
25. See David S. Jackson, Litigation Valley in California, High-Tech Firms Battle Securities Law-
yers over a Plaintiff-Friendly Referendum, TIME, Nov. 4, 1996, at 72 (“The battle over Proposition 211
is already the most expensive ballot initiative in history.  Nearly $46 million has been spent so far, the
bulk coming from opponents, including the Big Six accounting firms and high-tech firms from Apple to
Xilinx.”).
26. See Elizabeth Corcoran, California Voters Reject Proposition 211, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1996,
at D3.
27. The fear that measures similar to Proposition 211 would be introduced in other states has so
far proved to be unfounded.  There have been no efforts made to liberalize the blue sky laws of any
state.  In fact, three states—Arizona, Montana, and Ohio—have adopted the reforms contained in the
Reform Act thereby narrowing, rather than broadening, state court remedies for securities violations.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2081-2087 (1997); 1997 Mont. Laws 468; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
1707.432-438 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
28. See October 29 Hearing, supra note 14, at 36 (statement of Senator Christopher Dodd)
(“[W]ithout a national standard for liability, the potential threat is always there that one state will
change its laws in such a way as to become the haven for litigation.  This almost happened in California
last year with Proposition 211.  The potential remains it could successfully happen elsewhere in the fu-
ture.”).
29. See, e.g., Mike France, Bye, Fraud Suits.  Hello, Fraud Suits., BUS. WK, June 24, 1996, at 127
(discussing movement of securities class actions from federal to state court in effort by plaintiffs’ bar to
sidestep the Reform Act).
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companies were sued in state court securities class actions.30 Grundfest and
Perino reported that there was a “de minimis” level of class actions at the state
level in prior years,31  and concluded that the Reform Act likely “has induced a
material substitution effect that may have shifted weaker claims to state
court.”32
2.  The Quality of the State Cases.  The Commission has consistently stressed
that data on the quantity of lawsuits tells us little.33  Of paramount importance
is the quality of the claims in each lawsuit.  There has yet to be conducted an
empirical study that convincingly supports the accusation that the cases
appearing in state court are of poor quality.  The Staff Report analyzed twenty-
six state class action complaints, representing thirty-seven percent of the
complaints filed in state court during 1996.  The allegations appeared to
resemble closely those found in federal complaints:
(i)15% of the state court complaints we reviewed were based solely on failed forecasts
(as compared to 12% at the federal level);
(ii) 46% contained insider trading allegations (as compared to 48% at the federal
level);
(iii) 38% contained allegations of accounting irregularities (as compared to 43% at
the federal level);
(iv) 15% contained allegations of a restatement of the financials (as compared to 18%
at the federal level);
(v) 8% contained allegations of a concurrent government investigation (as compared
to 15% at the federal level); and
(vi) 15% contained none of the above allegations (as compared to 14% at the federal
level).
34
State complaints having no parallel federal action, however, were more
likely to be based solely on failed forecasts.  These are precisely the kind of
cases which most concerned Congress.  We analyzed 16 stand-alone state com-
plaints.  The results were as follows:
(i) 25% of these complaints were based solely on failed forecasts (as compared to
12% at the federal level);
(ii) 25% contained insider trading allegations (as compared to 48% at the federal
level);
                                                          
30. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year’s
Experience, CORNERSTONE RES., Feb. 27, 1997, at 8.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 4.
33. See Hearing Concerning the Impact of the Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 4
(1997) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) (“As the
Staff Report noted, however, meaningful conclusions cannot be drawn about the effectiveness of the
Reform Act purely from the raw number of filings.  Numbers alone do not reveal whether the cases
are meritorious or meritless.”) [Hereinafter Levitt July 24 Testimony].
34. Staff Report, supra note 15 and accompanying text, at 71-2.
WALKER.FMT 09/17/98  8:01 AM
244 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 60: No. 3
(iii) 31% contained allegations of accounting irregularities (as compared to 43% at
the federal level);
(iv) 13% contained allegations of a restatement of the financials (as compared to 18%
at the federal level);
(v) 6% contained allegations of a concurrent government investigation (as compared
to 15% at the federal level); and
(vi) 25% contained none of the above allegations (as compared to 14% at the federal
level).
35
While this review suggests that the mix of allegations at the federal level is
stronger than the mix at the state level, the Staff Report explicitly cautioned
that “the small sample size does not allow for a definitive assessment of the
stand-alone state complaints.”36  Nevertheless, some advocates have cited these
statistics in support of preemption.37  At present, however, the data is insuffi-
cient to justify broad preemption.
D. The SEC Staff  Report
The Staff Report was prepared by the Commission’s Office of the General
Counsel in response to a request from President Clinton.  While the overall
conclusion of the Report was that it was too soon to gauge the effects of the
Reform Act, the Report did make a number of preliminary observations.  It
identified three principal areas of concern regarding the implementation of the
Reform Act.  Two of the problem areas identified by the Commission  (the safe
harbor and the discovery stay) have been seized upon by preemption propo-
nents to support their case. 38
1.  Concerns with the Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements.  Based
on anecdotal evidence, the staff noted that the safe harbor is not encouraging
companies voluntarily to disclose more forward-looking information.39  Issuers
informed the staff that their primary concern is the lack of judicial guidance
regarding the required “meaningful cautionary” language.40  Concern about
                                                          
35. See id. at 73.
36. Id. at 74.
37. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 1260, The “Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997” Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong.
49 (1997) (testimony of Robert Hinckley, on behalf of the American Electronics Association)
(“[According to the SEC] the number of state court class actions alleging fraud based on a company’s
failure to achieve a forecast or prediction is double the number of such cases being filed in federal
court.”).
38. The third problem area identified in the Staff Report is lack of institutional involvement pur-
suant to the Reform Act’s lead plaintiff provision.  It does not appear likely that preemption would
encourage institutional participation or otherwise address the problem.
39. The staff’s preliminary observation concerning the use of the safe harbor was primarily based
on interviews of corporate officers and outside counsel for issuers.
40. Staff Report, supra note 15 and accompanying text, at 25.  The Middle District of North Caro-
lina recently handed down the first decision interpreting the safe harbor.  See Rasheedi v. Cree Re-
search, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16968 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 17, 1997).  Although the court dismissed the
complaint on safe harbor grounds, the opinion does not seek to define the term “meaningful” caution-
ary statements.
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potential liability under state law, where the statements may not be protected
by the federal safe harbor, was the second most frequently cited reason for not
making more forward-looking disclosure.41  This finding has served as one of
the main battle cries in favor of preemption.42  While any such problem could
be rectified by a narrow preemption bill simply importing the safe harbor into
state securities class actions, those favoring preemption have used it as a
cornerstone in their case for broad preemption.  
A recent study, however, calls into question the Staff Report’s finding and
the arguments based thereon by preemption proponents.  The study, conducted
by three business school professors, analyzed the disclosures made by 547 com-
puter, software, and drug firms, during the year before and after passage of the
Reform Act.43  The main finding of the study is that “there was a significant
post-Act increase in both the frequency of firms issuing forecasts and the mean
number of forecasts issued.”44  Specifically, the study found that the number of
firms issuing projections increased by five percent post-Reform Act and the
mean number of forecasts issued increased from 2.1 pre-Reform Act to 2.5
post-Reform Act.45
Notwithstanding this recent study, the absence of safe harbor protection in
state court poses a real problem.  Admittedly some form of preemption may be
in order here.  At least in theory, if there is no safe harbor in state court, there
is no safe harbor at all.  While more issuers may be making projections now
than before the Reform Act, such disclosure would likely become even more
commonplace should causes of actions for failed forecasts be foreclosed in state
court.
2.  Concerns with the Discovery Stay.  The Staff Report recognized that, in a
fair number of cases, the plaintiffs’ bar brought cases in state court that were
similar to cases brought in federal court.46  Such parallel cases permitted
plaintiffs to obtain discovery that they could not get in federal court due to the
                                                          
41. See Staff Report, supra note 15 and accompanying text, at 25.
42. See October 29 Hearing, supra note 14, at 20 (testimony of Robert Hinckley, Vice President,
Xilinx, on behalf of the American Electronics Association) (“[B]ecause of both the reality and the
threat of state court suits, high technology companies are reluctant to rely on the federal safe har-
bor.”); id. at 75 (testimony of Daniel Cooperman, General Counsel, Oracle Corp.) (“The conflicting
state standards which govern private securities litigation fundamentally reduce a corporation’s willing-
ness to provide any forward-looking information to the public.”); Hearing on the Implementation of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 Before the Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Ma-
terials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 5-6 (1997) (written testimony of Bruce G.
Vanyo) (“As a result of plaintiffs freely filing failed predictions cases in state court, where there is no
safe harbor protection, public companies cannot be expected to make forward-looking statements,
precisely contrary to Congress’s intent in enacting the safe harbor. . . .”).
43. See Marilyn Johnson, Ron Kasznik, & Karen K. Nelson, The Impact of Securities Litigation
Reform on the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High Technology Firms, Research Pa-
per No. 1471 (Jan. 1998).
44. Id. at 23.
45. See id. at 12.
46. Staff Report, supra note 15 and accompanying text, at 70 (stating that 26 of the 195 federal
class actions filed in 1996 were tied to a parallel state action).
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discovery stay.  The absence of an automatic discovery stay in state court
actions was seen as creating the potential for evasion of the federal discovery
stay.  Again, while this problem is capable of being remedied by a narrow
targeted preemption bill importing the discovery stay into state law, it has
supplied ammunition for those seeking broad preemption.47
III
THE CASE AGAINST BROAD PREEMPTION
A.  The Reform Act is Not Tried and Tested
Throughout the preemption debate, the Commission has preached an im-
portant message:  The short time since passage of the Act has not allowed for
sufficient practical experience with its key provisions or for many court deci-
sions interpreting those provisions.  In particular, the appellate courts have had
virtually no opportunity to interpret the Act.  No case has made its way to a
jury; relatively few motions to dismiss have been decided; and there have been
even fewer reported settlements.  This alone mandates a cautious approach to-
ward making federal securities law the exclusive law of the land.
The initial decisions interpreting the Reform Act have focused mainly on
the Act’s heightened pleading standards, with disagreement among the district
courts as to the proper interpretation of the standards.  To date, fourteen cases
have held that the Reform Act meant to adopt the standard existing in the Sec-
ond Circuit prior to the Act’s passage.48  The Second Circuit standard allows a
plaintiff to plead either that the defendant had a motive and opportunity to
commit the fraud or facts constituting strong circumstantial evidence of con-
scious behavior or recklessness.49  There have been six cases, however, that
have refused to follow the Second Circuit standard.  These cases hold that after
the Reform Act, plaintiffs may no longer allege merely reckless behavior,50 but
                                                          
47. See, e.g., AMERICAN ELEC. ASS’N, A WHITE PAPER ON SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM,
10-12 (1997) (highlighting the problem).
48. See Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc.,
961 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1997); In re The Wellcare Management Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 964 F.
Supp. 632 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Page v. Derrickson, No. 96-842-CIV-T-17C, 1997 WL 148558  (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 25, 1997); Galaxy Inv. Fund, Ltd. v. Fenchurch Management, Ltd., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13207
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 1997); Pilarcyzk v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 965 F. Supp. 311 (N.D.N.Y. 1997);
OnBank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Health Management, Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. CV 96-889, 1997 WL 413895 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 1997); Gilford Ptnrs. L.P. v. Sensormatic
Elec. Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13724 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 1997); Weikel v. Tower Semiconductor
Ltd., No. 96-3711 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 1997); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceuticals Corp.,
927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Zeid v. Kimberley, 930 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Cal. 1996), appeal dock-
eted, No 97-16070 (9th Cir.); STI Classic Fund v. Bollinger Indus., Inc., No. 3:96-CV-823-R, 1996 WL
866699 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1996); Fischler v. AmSouth Bancorporation, No. 96-1567-CIV-T-17A, 1996
WL 686565 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 1996).
49. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp., Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994); Beck v. Manufactur-
ers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1978).
50. Friedberg v. Discreet Logic Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997); Powers v. Eichen, 961 F.
Supp. 233 (S.D. Cal. 1997); Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y.
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rather may only plead facts demonstrating that the defendants acted con-
sciously.  The Commission strongly believes that liability based on reckless mis-
conduct is vital to investor protection and has appeared as amicus on the issue
in three Reform Act cases arguing in favor of the Second Circuit standard.51
The issue will soon be addressed by federal appellate courts.52
All states currently allow a securities fraud cause of action based on reck-
less behavior.  In the event federal appellate courts rule that recklessness no
longer suffices, state courts would provide a vital safety net.  Otherwise, allow-
ing corporate executives to “look the other way” without liability would pro-
mote corporate misconduct and detract from investor confidence.  The issue is
of such importance that it alone counsels caution in the preemption debate.
B. State Courts Afford Important Rights and Remedies to Investors
Unavailable at the Federal Level
State courts offer defrauded investors at least two significant benefits un-
available in federal court: private rights of action against aiders and abettors,
and longer statutes of limitations.  The Commission has always relied on pri-
vate actions in both federal and state courts as an important supplement to the
Commission’s efforts to combat fraud and misconduct in the markets.  In 1994,
the Supreme Court ruled that there is no private right of action against aiders
and abettors under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.53  The Commission
strongly urged Congress to restore this right,54 however Congress declined to do
so.  In contrast, each state provides a form of cause of action against aiders and
abettors.
In 1991, the Supreme Court imposed a short statute of limitations in federal
securities fraud actions.55  The Court held that a private action under Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act must be brought within one year after discovery of
the fraud, but in no event later than three years after occurrence of the under-
lying conduct.56  In contrast, thirty-three states provide longer statutes of limita-
                                                          
1997); Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1997); In re Comshare Inc. Sec. Litig.,
No. 96-73711-DT (E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 1997), appeal docketed, No. 97-2098 (6th Cir.).
51. The Commission has appeared in In re Silicon Graphics. No. C-96-0393; In re Comshare Inc.,
No. 97-2098; and Zeid, No. 97-16070.
52. At the time of this writing, Silicon Graphics and Zeid are pending before the Ninth Circuit of
Appeals and Comshare is pending before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Decisions are expected
in 1998.
53. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
54. See Impact of U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: Central Bank of Denver of First Interstate Bank of
Denver: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Ur-
ban Affairs, 103d Cong. 14 (1994) (testimony of Arthur Levitt) (“Legislation is also needed to restore
aiding and abetting liability in private actions which are a necessary supplement to [the SEC’s] overall
enforcement program.”).
55. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
56. Id. at 356-61.
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tions.57  The Commission has urged Congress to lengthen the federal limitations
period to three years after discovery of the fraud, but no later than five years
after occurrence of the misconduct.58  Congress has not done so.
C.  No Apparent Migration of Securities Class Actions to State Courts
In opposition to the findings of the study performed by Grundfest and
Perino,59 two more recent studies cast doubt on whether there has in fact been a
migration of cases to state courts and, if so, whether the movement was any-
thing other than a brief transitory phenomenon.  One of the studies was con-
ducted by Price Waterhouse, which tallied the number of state securities class
actions between 1991 and 1997.  The results were as follows:60
State Class Actions
Year Number
1991 46
1992 31
1993 47
1994 67
1995 52
— Passage of the Reform Act —
1996 66
1997 44
According to this study, the number of state securities class actions in the
years following passage of the Reform Act is on par with the years prior to pas-
sage.  There was an average of fifty-five securities class actions filed per year in
state court during 1996 and 1997; the average number filed during 1991 through
1995 was fifty-three.  Also, the National Economics Research Associates
(“NERA”) issued a study in July 1997 finding that the 1996 trends in the num-
ber of state class action filings were “transient.”61  The NERA study found that
the number of filings during the first five months of 1997 had returned to the
level observed in the five years prior to passage of the Reform Act.62
In any event, whether or not there has been a migration of class actions to
state court in the wake of the Reform Act, two things are clear:  The percent-
age of such litigation in comparison to all litigation in state court is minute, and
                                                          
57. See Hearing Concerning S. 1260, the “Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997” be-
fore the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 104th
Cong. (1997).
58. See The Securities Investors Legal Rights Act of 1991: Hearings Before the House Sucomm. on
Telecommunications and Fin., Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 102nd Cong. (1991) (testimony of
Richard C. Breeden, former Chairman, SEC) (expressing strong support for lengthening the statute of
limitations in private securities actions).
59. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
60. PRICE WATERHOUSE, SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY  1 (Jan. 1998).
61. See Federal Shareholder Class Action Filings Rise to Pre-Reform Act Levels as State Filings
Fall,  NERA, July 1997.
62. See id.
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second, the incidence of such litigation is highly concentrated in just one state,
California.  There are approximately fifteen million civil cases filed in state
court annually,63 roughly fifty of which are securities class actions.  Of these
fifty securities class actions, roughly sixty-two percent are filed in California.64
Arguments in support of  broad-based preemption based on an average of less
than one suit per week filed in state court topple of their own weight.
IV
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
Notwithstanding the findings of the Staff Report, various members of Con-
gress have introduced  preemption bills that go far beyond addressing the Re-
form Act problem areas identified by the Commission.  On May 21, 1997, Rep-
resentative Anna Eshoo (D-Cal.) and Representative Rick White (R-Wash.)
jointly introduced a bill that would preempt most state securities fraud class ac-
tions.65  In a press release issued at the time their bill was introduced, Represen-
tatives Eshoo and White made clear that, based on the Grundfest and Perino
Study,66 they believed a migration of cases to state court was occurring and that
legislation was needed to end this practice.67  Five months later, on October 7,
1997, Senators Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) and Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) intro-
duced a companion bill in the Senate.68  It appears that concern over a shift in
litigation to state court was the motivating factor behind the Dodd-Gramm bill
as well.69
The provisions of House Bill 1689 and Senate Bill 1260 are similar.  First,
each bill preempts cases alleging either the making of a material misrepresenta-
tion or omission, or the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contriv-
                                                          
63. See October 29 Hearing, supra note 14, at 79.
64. See Levitt July 24 Testimony, supra note 33, at 16.
65. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, H.R. 1689., 105th Cong. (1997).  Rep. Tom
Campbell (D-Cal.) had introduced similar legislation on May 16, 1997.  See H.R. 1653.  It appears,
however, that the momentum is behind H.R. 1689.  The main difference between H.R. 1689 and H.R.
1653 is that the former would only preempt class actions, while the latter would preempt all actions.
66. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
67. See Press Release, Rep. Eshoo and Rep. White Introduce Uniform Standards Legislation for
Securities Strike Suits, May 21, 1997 (“A federal preemption over state jurisdiction in these cases is
needed because lawyers are now avoiding federal courts in favor of state courts, where companies are
more vulnerable.  From early 1996 through October 1996, securities class actions filed in federal court
decreased by approximately 20% from the same period in 1995.  However, suits of this type in state
courts have nearly doubled in the same period.”).
68. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997, S. 1260, 105th Cong.
69. See October 29 Hearing, supra note 14, at 5 (statement of Senator Gramm) (“We held a hear-
ing earlier this year to take a look at how the new law [the Reform Act] was being received and how it
was working.  We discovered from that hearing that what was occurring is that it [sic] has simply been
a shift of all these lawsuits into state court.  So, Senator Dodd and I thought about this, looked at it and
decided to introduce a bill that basically said that for class action suits, and class action suits only,
where you are dealing with a stock that is traded nationally, so there is clearly an overriding national
interest, that those suits have to be filed in federal court.”); Lynn Stevens Hume, Senators Introduce
Preemption Bill; GFOA, Others Call Move Unwarranted, BOND BUYER 1 (Oct. 8, 1997) (quoting Sena-
tor Dodd as stating that the bill will “address this state litigation problem before it gets completely out
of control”).
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ance in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.  The bills’ language
appears to be based, at least in part, on that of Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, the
antifraud provision most often charged in federal class actions.
Second, each bill preempts only “class actions,” defined primarily as those
suits where “damages are sought on behalf of more than twenty-five persons.”
The twenty-five person threshold appears somewhat arbitrary and low.  Fur-
ther, the bills defined “class action” to include any “single lawsuit, or any group
of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court.”70  The Commission has ex-
pressed concern about the effects of allowing the grouping of lawsuits com-
bined with the low twenty-five person threshold:
[I]f [twenty-five] plaintiffs filed separate individual lawsuits, arising from the same set
of facts, in the same state court, it is likely that each of these lawsuits would be pre-
empted because they would be regarded as a “group” of lawsuits involving common
questions of law or fact.  In an era where it is not uncommon for a corporation to have
hundreds of millions of shares outstanding and hundreds of thousands of investors,
the twenty-five person limit, combined with the allowance for grouping, could serve to
preempt many individual actions.
71
Third, each bill preempts not only state blue sky statutory claims but all
common law claims as well, which include claims for fraud and negligent mis-
representation.  Further, these claims are preempted even if brought as pen-
dent claims in federal court, where the terms of the Reform Act would apply.
This last point has received little attention.  If the purpose of preemption is to
ensure that the Reform Act is not frustrated, it is unclear why state claims can-
not be heard in federal court, where defendants will have all the safeguards of
the Reform Act.
The Senate and House bills differ in one key aspect—the types of securities
falling within their coverage.  Senate Bill 1260 only preempts cases based on
transactions involving a “covered security.”  Keying off of a definition provided
by the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Senate Bill 1260
defines “covered security” to include primarily those listed on the NYSE,
AMEX, or Nasdaq NMS, or securities issued by investment companies.  House
Bill 1689 defines “covered security” significantly more broadly, covering all se-
curities of an issuer so long as the issuer had outstanding any security listed on
the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq NMS.
If either bill were to pass into law, the result would be that most securities
class actions could no longer be brought in state court under state law.  The
main exception would be the continuing availability of state class actions
against companies issuing penny and  microcap stocks, an exception the Com-
                                                          
70. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997, H.R. 1689., 105th Cong.; Securities Liti-
gation Uniform Standards Act of 1997, S. 1260, 105th Cong.
71. Letter from Isaac C. Hunt, Jr. SEC Commissioner to Senator Wayne Allard, (Nov. 21, 1997)
(on file with author).
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mission favors.72  The Commission has also advised the Congress that it strongly
supports the rights of individuals to continue to sue in state court.73
VI
CONCLUSION
By the time this article is published, Congress will likely have taken action
on one or more of the three legislative proposals that have been introduced.
There appears to be strong support for imposing additional limitations on pri-
vate securities actions, although the reasons asserted in favor of legislation
broadly preempting state law claims do not withstand careful analysis.  Never-
theless, the legislation must also be evaluated from the point of view of whether
it is desirable to adopt a national standard for claims involving securities traded
over national exchanges.  Such a standard undoubtedly would provide greater
certainty to issuers selling securities nationwide and would help effectuate key
Reform Act provisions such as the safe harbor and the discovery stay.
Any national standard that is enacted, however, must be one that ade-
quately protects the rights of injured investors.  Given the current assaults on
the existing standard that permits recovery for reckless conduct, we must pro-
ceed cautiously.  If Congress elects to preempt state law claims that permit re-
covery for reckless behavior in favor of a federal standard that is limited to
deny such recovery, we will have achieved a uniform standard but at an unac-
ceptable cost.
                                                          
72. See October 29 Hearing, supra note 14, at 18 (noting a rise in fraud in these markets and con-
cluding that due to the concerns of both the federal government and the states in this area, preemption
of class claims involving penny and micro-cap stocks is unwarranted.)
73. See id. at 17 (pointing out that individual actions at the state level are particularly appropriate
when claims against stock brokers for churning or misappropriation are involved).
